Integrity Bodies

QWAG has a suite of proposals that can strongly influence integrity bodies such as Ombudsman Offices and any National Integrity Commission [NIC] to greater integrity.

The principal enabler for fighting corruption is that the Whistleblower MUST SURVIVE. If the whistleblower survives, so too does the disclosure and the witness, so too do the opportunities for fighting the corruption or wrongdoing.

A Whistleblower Protection Authority (WPA) with appropriate powers, properly resourced and with access to the budget of offending agencies to cover costs of legal action, can greatly contribute to that cause. For protection to be effective, the assumption that agencies and watchdogs are well-intentioned towards whistleblowers must be abandoned, and instead accept that any agency, as an organisational unit, can be ill-intentioned towards those who make disclosures about that agency in the public interest.

This effort to establish a Whistleblower Protection Authority will be directed at defending the first and highest priority target of ill-intentioned agencies and watchdogs when wrongdoing in those agencies is disclosed, namely, getting rid of the whistleblower.

The supporting approach is to limit the known tactics of agencies and their watchdog authorities to defeat disclosures and neutralise whistleblowers with prejudice. QWAG has mapped many of these tactics by agencies and watchdog authorities. The power to enforce these provisions should be given to a Whistleblower Protection Authority where the tactic has been used against the career and welfare of whistleblowers. In this conclusion, QWAG gives four primary examples, with some comment.

Destruction of documents. The principles in case law as to how courts are to give regard to plaintiffs claims when the defendant has destroyed or disposed of documents, should be incorporated into whistleblower protection legislation.

The Government being a Model Litigant. Each instance obtained, of where a government has used a deliberate administrative or litigation tactic so as to cause more costly and longer lasting litigation, needs to be counteracted. For example, the tactic of losing documents, and then finding them again when a plaintiff pursues the defendant for this loss, could be counteracted by the legislation causing any statement by any government authority that a document has been lost, or a failure to present any document for a period of three months, could initiate the procedures for ‘Destruction of Documents’ in actions to protect whistleblowers. An ability for the WPA to invoice agencies in dealing with the treatment of whistleblowers, irrespective of the outcome of such actions, will influence agencies to deal with matters with less expense. The worst agencies will, however, spend without limit when the disclosure threatens serious repercussions for the agency and its principals.

Appointments having a Perceived Conflict of Interest. This tactic is very popular amongst ill-intentioned agencies. The principals of such agencies can become rattled by the fact that one of their number has blown the whistle on the wrongdoing systemically incorporated into the agency’s strategic and/or operational planning. An ability by the WPA to take action to veto such appointments in actions affecting whistleblowers, at the agencies expense, would worry ill-intentioned agencies whose modus operandi is based on control - the agency would sense that it was losing control. The veto also would encourage more disclosures by other members of that agency.

The Requirement to Give Detailed Reasons. While the narrative of the ‘domino’ document does not have a happy history, it did, nevertheless, betray the effectiveness of the rules requiring decision-makers to give detailed reasons when rejecting disclosures of criminal offence and unacceptable behaviour.

The Notion of ‘the Domino Document’

In law, the explanation for this type of 'domino' effect is open to be captured by Lord Denning's ruling in Lazarus Estate Ltd v Beasley [1956] 1 QB 702, [1956] 1 All ER 341, in which he stated:

‘Fraud unravels everything’.

… it vitiates judgments, contracts and all transactions whatsoever…

Fraud is the matter about which the ‘domino’ document, and all subsequent efforts to cover it up, informs.

The issue then is what would be different about the National Integrity Commission (NIC), that it would have chosen, from the beginning forty years ago, to force, by disclosure to Parliament or other powers given to the NIC, chiefs and managers, naturally unwilling to find wrongdoing in their own organisations, to have this wrongdoing fully addressed and corrected.

Some pertinent questions for authorities seeking the establishment of an NIC to answer are:

  1. What will be the design of the NIC that it will want to look at the ‘domino’ document where the COO never did, and where the COO surrendered its integrity to wilful blindness?
  2. What will be the design of the NIC so that it will want to obtain and preserve a copy of the ‘domino’ document when the COO has refused to do this, and surrendered its integrity to the standards of the lowest of the agencies that the COO overviews?
  3. What will be the design of the NIC that it will accept argument and evidence on the basis that the evidence has substance, rather than find and / or rely on self-serving escape words to dismiss substantive evidence on the basis that it is not 'new', or other response that surrenders the integrity of the NIC to regulatory capture.

 

A tactic used by the Complaints Resolution Agency in Defence, was to advise commanders facing allegations from whistleblower disclosures, not to treat or progress those disclosures as a ‘Redress of Wrongs’ application – the Redress process is the process that required detailed reasons to be given.

Commanders were advised to make comment in performance appraisals about the officer or soldier, and to force the officer or soldier whistleblower to seek ‘Redress’ as part of the procedure allowed with unfavourable Performance Appraisals. The advantage for the commander here was that the Performance Appraisal procedure did not require that the commander give detailed reasons for any decision. That demonstrates the difficulty to ill-intentioned commanders and their advisers of the 'detailed reasons' requirement and one of the major efforts to get around the requirement. There were others.

The decision by an Investigation Officer to find that the whistleblower in the ‘domino’ document narrative was mentally imbalanced, in part because of his persistence in pursuing his rights to detailed reasons including findings on the facts about a document that he had been shown, occurred during an inquiry into military justice by eminent Australian jurist, The Honourable Sir Laurence Street. In the ‘Report on the Independent Review on the Health of the Reformed Military Justice System’, this eminent jurist stated:

As the final arbiters of many personnel performance decisions, commanders and managers must provide a clear ‘Statement of Reasons’ (SOR) for their executive decision making, indicating the factors that they have taken into consideration and any specific weightings that were used in making their executive decisions. These processes allow for executive decision making to be challenged and explained, providing a level of protection that should be reassuring for both the individual and the ADO. (underlining added)

The word ‘must’ is strongly emphatic of the link between detailed reasons and protection.

Currently, the Australian Defence Force has removed the Defence Instruction requiring detailed reasons, and the explanation of what was meant by ‘detailed reasons’ and what was not meant by the same terms have also been removed.

The words in that defence Instruction, now removed, is an excellent example of the approach recommended by QWAG in dealing with the tactics known to be used by ill-intentioned commanders and commands (or executives or managers). Specific words were added to the Defence Instruction to tell Chiefs of Army and Defence Force Chiefs that they could not use vague statements of reasons. Another example - the Public Service Act (Qld) instructed that appeals must address the complaint actually made, because of the common tactic of hearing appeals that were not made in lieu of the appeal actually made. Both of these provisions were unsuccessful because the provisions would not be enforced by respective Offices of the Ombudsman. Decisions about claims of abuse in Defence can now be given without reasons, and the Defence whistleblower experienced that in 2016. Twenty-one inquiries into military justice in 21 years, and yet the credibility of military justice has deteriorated, rather than been improved, by all those inquiries. Those inquiries, at an enormous public expense, appear to have been used to refine methods for abusing members within the military, instead of to deliver justice.

Lieutenant General Morrison’s saying that ‘the standard that you walk past is the standard that you set’, is trivial, and fundamentally misses the key duty. Rather, the appropriate saying for commanders in Defence is that ‘the standard that you set is what you do, sir, when nobody else is allowed to see’.

All this brings the focus back to QWAG's rationale about the importance of a WPA. This could be a force for enforcement of laws within allegedly ill-intentioned agencies like Defence.

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